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 (I) Introduction 
 
Asia has emerged as a much more important player in the global economy after the 
recent financial crisis.  Together with other emerging market economies, Asia is 
expected to be a key driver for global economic growth in the near to medium term.  
Along with this, there is a rising chorus for an “Asian approach” to financial reforms 
in the region and internationally.  There are also calls for Asia to play a bigger role in 
designing the new architecture for the global financial system. 
 
Such calls reflect Asia’s dissatisfaction with the Anglo-Saxon model of financial 
market development.  Many Asian economies see the recent financial crisis as a 
“Western”, rather than a “global” crisis, caused by the excesses of financial 
liberalization in the US and Europe.  They believe that they have fared much better 
and recovered more speedily than the West because of their more cautious approach 
to financial liberalization and other financial sector reforms that they had undertaken 
in the past decade.  They see the Dodd-Frank Act, the most comprehensive financial 
sector reforms in the US since the 1930s, as an attempt to rectify the weaknesses in 
the financial systems in the West, with limited relevance for their own financial 
systems.  
 
More broadly, Asian economies are facing very different policy challenges from those 
confronting the West.  While the US and the Europeans economies are still struggling 
to get back on a more robust growth path, saddled with high debt, poor sovereign 
credit ratings and the burden of increased regulation etc, Asian economies (except 
Japan) have recovered so rapidly that many of them are now facing the potential risk 
of overheating and asset bubbles. A key concern for Asian policy makers today is the 
management of capital inflows, especially short term speculative flows that can cause 
the exchange rates to become overvalued and result in asset bubbles.  The broader 
policy challenges have a strong bearing on Asia’s views on the priorities in financial 
system reforms. 
 
In this paper, we will discuss the divergent views between Asia and the West on the 
recent financial crisis.  We will also look at the “Asian approach” to financial sector 
reforms and what Asia expects to see in the new architecture of the international 
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financial system.  The paper is divided into 4 sections.  In Section II, we will look at 
the question of why the recent crisis is seen to be more “Western” than “global”. In 
Section III, we discuss the various measures that Asian economies would like to see 
implemented under an “Asian approach” to financial sector reforms.  Specifically, we 
will highlight the different policy challenges that Asian economies face compared 
with the US and Europe, and how these differences influence their priorities in 
financial sector reforms. We conclude in Section IV. 
 
(II) A “Western” Financial Crisis 
The fundamental causes of the recent financial crisis are arguably no different from 
the past crises in the world, including the 1997/98 Asia financial crisis.  At the root of 
the crisis is a liquidity and insolvency crisis triggered by a panic run by investors and 
financial institutions after an extended period of excessive lending and borrowing.  
Investor greed, misguided policies and lax regulation and supervision helped fuel the 
explosive growth of credit and liquidity leading up to the crisis.   
 
What made this crisis different from the previous ones were the heightened systemic 
risks in the financial sector that allowed the “trigger” to be “amplified” rapidly across 
the globe, making the impact much greater and more widespread than it would 
otherwise have been. A number of new developments in recent years have helped 
account for the heightened systemic risks.  These include the emergence of an 
elaborate structure of new financial instruments that substantially increased the 
opaqueness in the financial system and a lax regulatory regime that allowed an 
extremely high level of leverage to develop within a few years.2 Just as significant is 
the aggressive financial liberalization in the West that led to an unprecedented degree 
of interconnectedness among financial markets around the world.3  
Like the West, most Asian monetary authorities failed to rein in the credit and 
liquidity growth in their own economies before the crisis. But their caution in 
                                                 
2 This is typified by the following statement from Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve 
Chairman, on 25 September 2002, when commenting on regulation towards over-the-counter 
derivatives market: “…. But regulation is not only unnecessary in these markets, it is potentially 
damaging, because regulation presupposes disclosure and forced disclosure of proprietary information 
can undercut innovations in financial markets just as it would in real estate markets.”  
 
3 See for example, Blanchard, 2009, and Blanchard, 2010.  
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financial liberalization helped spared them the worst of the “amplifier” effects.  In 
particular, they were reluctant to open up their financial sectors aggressively over the 
past decade, despite strong urging from the West and the IMF. Fear of capital flow 
volatility which was seen as the main cause of the 1997/98 Asia financial crisis, 
remains a key concern among Asian policy makers.  Such reluctance to open up the 
financial sector often subjects them to criticism of being too cautious and conservative 
in reforming their financial systems and developing their capital markets, with the 
result that the financial systems are viewed as “inefficient”.  
Ironically, it is such “inefficiency” that proved to be an important strength in the 
recent crisis. For example, the various layers of capital controls and the reluctance 
among some Asian countries (e.g. Japan) to promote “innovative financial products” 
helped prevent the financial systems from being infected with “toxic assets” that 
brought down the US and the European financial institutions.  Meanwhile, the slow 
progress in financial sector integration in Asia is seen to have helped limit the 
contagion effect across the region.   
Asian economies were also helped by the many fundamental reforms they had carried 
out after the Asia financial crisis. Many of them adopted policies and measures aimed 
at protecting themselves from the vagaries of the capital markets and the perceived 
bias of the international monetary system. They restructured and recapitalized the 
banking systems and the corporate sectors, opened up the real economies to trade and 
investment, strengthened the supervisory and regulatory frameworks of the financial 
systems, and adopted an inflation targeting policy framework to enhance the 
credibility of their macroeconomic policy management. 
The large and persistent current account surpluses that Asian economies ran and the 
substantial amounts of foreign reserves that they built up as a result, provided self-
insurance against currency speculation and sudden capital withdrawals. The central 
banks intervened in the foreign exchange market to sterilize the inflow or outflow of 
speculative funds, so as to minimize their impact on the exchange rates and bank 
liquidity and to maintain financial stability. Asian countries also set up various 
regional mutual support mechanisms such as the Chiangmai Initiative, to help pool 
the foreign reserves in the region as a form of regional self-insurance. 
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Asia’s success in managing the crisis and in staging a strong and robust recovery has 
led to increased scepticism about the financial reforms prescribed by the West and the 
IMF.  It has strengthened the belief among Asian economies that they should take an 
“Asian approach” to such reforms.  It has also prompted many Asian countries to ask 
for a bigger role in setting the pace and the agenda of global financial system reforms.   
The credibility of the US and the European policy makers was further undermined by 
what Asia perceived as the “double standards” that they practised in their responses to 
the recent crisis.  Both the US and the European countries responded to the outbreak 
of the crisis with a massive bailout of the financial system by easing monetary policy, 
expanding the balance sheets of the central banks and pumping massive amounts of 
liquidity into the system. This was something that the Asian countries were strongly 
advised against during the 1997/98 Asia financial crisis. It was also something that 
Asia could not have done on its own without the liquidity support of the IMF and the 
US as it would have led to a collapse of their exchange rates and financial systems.  
The reserve currency status of the US dollar and the shortage of dollar liquidity 
worldwide during the recent crisis, however, allowed the Federal Reserve to carry out 
such monetary expansion without causing a run on the US dollar. The main 
alternative to holding the US dollar would have been to hold the Euro but Europe was 
just as badly affected by the crisis as the US. 
During the crisis, the US and Europe also mounted the biggest post-war fiscal budgets 
to help prevent a collapse in economic activity, knowing that such massive fiscal 
programs could lead to a sharp rise in their public debt and a deterioration in their 
sovereign credit.  In contrast, Asia was advised by the IMF and the West to do the 
opposite and to tighten their budgets in 1997/98, in order to support their exchange 
rates.  Such policies were extremely contractionary which inevitably added to the 
steep decline in economic activities and eventually caused the collapse of a few Asian 
economies.   
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(III) An “Asian” Approach to Financial Reform and Integration 
 A hierarchy of financial system and regulatory regimes... 
The recent reforms proposed in the US, UK, Europe and by the IMF and Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) are directed at remedying the fundamental weaknesses in their 
financial systems, as revealed in the recent financial crisis. These weaknesses include, 
among others, the opacity of the cumulative risk inherent in structured products, the 
lack of oversight of the off balance sheet risk of banks, the repackaging of mortgages 
to offload the underlying risk to investors, the moral hazard problems posed by big 
financial institutions which are deemed “too big” and/or “too interconnected” to fail 
etc. 4 While many of the problems highlighted by these proposals could serve as 
warnings to Asian economies of potential hazards in future, they are not pertinent to 
most Asian countries at this point in time.     
Asia is a heterogenous region with a very diverse group of countries at different levels 
of economic and financial development.   On one extreme are countries like Japan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia which are advanced developed economies with 
sophisticated economic and financial systems.   On the other extreme are countries 
like Laos, Cambodia, Myammar and Mongolia which are among the least developed 
economies in the world with only basic economic and financial structures.   The 
majority of the Asian countries are medium-income emerging markets economies at 
varying levels of development.   
 
Except for the few more advanced countries, the financial systems in most Asian 
economies are still fairly simple comprising the banking system, the stock market and 
a fledging bond market.  The main functions of the financial institutions are to 
provide liquidity and payment services, mobilize domestic savings and provide loans 
to households and businesses.  Many of the flaws that contributed to the meltdown of 
the financial markets in the Western economies in the recent crisis such as those 
mentioned above, are hardly relevant in most Asian economies.  Neither is there the 
same degree of close inter-connectedness among individual Asian financial markets 
                                                 
4 See US Senate, 2010 for a more detailed description of these proposals.    
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or between Asian and Western financial markets that contributed to the severe 
contagion effects in the West. 
 
Even in the more advanced economies like Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
capital markets are not as “advanced” and “liberalized” as those in the US and UK.  
The challenges these countries face are therefore quite different.  For example, while 
some of the problems that the Dodd-Frank Act addresses such as the management of 
the off-balance sheet liabilities of banks, the OTC trading of Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) and other derivatives etc are also present in the advanced Asian economies, the 
problems are far less severe and far from being the most important issues confronting 
the financial regulators in Asia. In some ways, one could argue that the Dodd-Frank 
Act represents a step back by the financial regulators in the US, and a move towards 
the more conservative stance of Asia.   
 
Given the diversity of these countries, it is natural that the type of financial system 
that is suitable and along with that, the type of regulatory regime that is appropriate 
for each of them will be different. There is no “one size fits all” financial system for 
the whole region. Each country should choose a regulatory regime that can effectively 
facilitate and not stifle its economic development.  The choice of regulatory regime 
should not be dictated by that prescribed for the advanced Western economies.   
A Different Approach to Financial Integration in Asia... 
A major contributor to the recent crisis, as we noted earlier, was the high degree of 
inter-connectedness among the financial markets in the West. Asian economies are 
not against greater financial sector integration and inter-connectedness.  On the 
contrary, a number of major initiatives have been rolled out after the Asia financial 
crisis to promote greater regional financial integration, especially among the 
ASEAN+3 countries in order to improve the efficiency of financial intermediation in 
the region.  However, what Asian countries have learned from the recent crisis is that 
financial integration can be a major source of contagion as they provide a channel for 
financial crisis to spread rapidly across countries.  They are mindful of the need to 
avoid the mistakes that Europe and the US made in financial integration. 
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A major challenge for Asia is to develop a financial superstructure that is able to 
integrate the diverse financial systems across the region so that they complement and 
support each other, despite the different levels of economic and financial 
development, in order to help raise the efficiency of capital flows for the whole 
region. Such a financial superstructure would, for instance, channel excess savings 
from the surplus countries to the deficit countries in the region.  It would also 
facilitate the provision of advanced financial services from the more advanced 
economies to the less developed ones.  In addition, it should intermediate the flow of 
funds not only within the region but also between the region and the rest of the world. 
The architecture of such a financial system would be analogous to that of the 
production and trade network that has developed in the region where each country 
specializes in a particular segment of the production value chain. 5 In the case of the 
financial sector, financial institutions in various countries will be providing financial 
services to the local economies and drawing upon the more advanced centres like 
Hong Kong and Singapore for services which are not available locally such as 
investment banking and advisory, private banking, asset management, and hedging 
products. Over time, as the economies grow and the demand for financial services 
expands, the financial system in each of the countries will also grow to meet the local 
demand. The economics of agglomeration will likely lead to the emergence of a few 
regional or global centres which serve as the financial services hub for the whole 
region. 
A key player in this architecture will be the large regional and global banks which are 
able to provide the full range of financial services and have branches across the 
region. These banks are able to customize their financial services to the domestic 
needs of the individual economies by deciding whether to provide a particular 
financial service locally or by drawing on the resources of their parent banks.   This is 
not unlike the role played by the large global multinational corporations (MNCs) in 
the manufacturing sector.   Typically, the parent MNC will slice up the value chain of 
the production process and decide where to locate the production of each segment of 
the value chain to take advantage of the cost competitiveness of each country.   Such a 
production network has transformed Asia into a highly competitive manufacturing 
                                                 
5 See Tan and Khor, 2006. 
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hub for the world, with efficient flows of resources across the whole region.  Managed 
well, a similar outcome could be achieved for the financial sector.  
With such a regional financial superstructure, there should be a hierarchy of 
regulatory regimes corresponding to the range of financial systems in the region.  The 
regulatory regimes should be structured in such a way that, over time, as the financial 
system in an individual country develops and becomes more advanced, its regulatory 
regime will also evolve and become more sophisticated.  Such a regulatory structure 
would imply for instance that it is not necessary nor appropriate for the majority of 
Asian countries to adopt the regulatory changes currently being proposed in the US 
and Europe.  However, over time, as their financial systems develop and become 
more advanced, the regulatory regimes could converge. 
Different Priorities of Asian Economies… 
Asian countries are generally more concerned about the risks posed by speculative 
capital flows to the stability of their economies and financial systems.  They attribute 
a large part of their own success in coping with the recent crisis to their ability in 
managing and containing such speculative capital flows, drawing on lessons they 
learned from the Asia financial crisis a decade earlier.  However, the potential 
“overheating” problems currently faced by several Asian countries show that 
minimising the risk of speculative capital flows remains a key challenge for them.  
 
Asian economies would like to see the issue of volatile capital flows and exchange 
rates addressed in a holistic manner in the reform of the international financial system.  
The reform should take into account the risks that such volatility posed to the 
economic well-being and financial stability of the region.  The cost of insuring against 
such volatility should be borne equitably by all the countries so that individual 
countries do not have to resort mainly to building up a huge stock of foreign reserves 
as self-insurance.  In this regard, Asian economies would also like to see a greater 
global consensus on the use of capital controls and other macro prudential measures 
to mitigate the adverse effects of capital flows on financial stability.    
 
Some progress has been made in these areas. For example, in its latest Global 
Financial Stability Report (GFSR), the IMF appears to openly endorse the judicious 
9 
 
use of capital control and other macro prudential measures to deal with the adverse 
effects of capital flows.6 In the wake of the recent financial crisis, there has also been 
a massive increase in the financial resources of the IMF and the IMF has established a 
short term liquidity facility (SLF) to provide large upfront financing to countries with 
strong policies and a good track record but which are facing temporary liquidity 
problems arising from developments in external capital markets. These measures offer 
some assurance that the IMF has become more responsive and is now more willing 
and able to provide liquidity support to Asian economies in the event of a balance of 
payment crisis.  This could in turn help enhance Asian economies’ confidence in the 
IMF and persuade some of them to reduce the use of foreign reserves as a form of 
self-insurance.     
 
Indeed, Asia’s seemingly relentless accumulation of foreign reserves has long been a 
controversial issue. Some economists believe that this had been an indirect cause of 
the recent crisis.  Most of Asia’s foreign reserves are invested in liquid financial 
assets in the West such as US Treasury bills. This had contributed to the easy liquidity 
condition or what Greenspan termed the “interest rate conundrum” which facilitated 
the financial innovations, excessive borrowing and lending, and the debt and asset 
bubbles that eventually burst and caused the financial meltdown.   
A Stronger Voice in International Forum… 
Asia is seeking to have a stronger voice in the governance of the international 
monetary and financial system, to reflect their increasingly larger presence in the 
global economy. They want the regulatory framework for the global financial system 
to be sufficiently flexible so that it can be sensitive to the developmental needs of the 
developing countries and is able to accommodate a wide range of financial systems.  
A number of recent developments have helped start this process. 
 
The elevation of the G20 into the premier international forum for managing the global 
economy and the international financial system is one such development. In effect, the 
G20 has now replaced the G7 as the premier global economic grouping.  The change 
marks the emergence of the big developing countries, led by China, as a global 
                                                 
6  See IMF, GFSR, October 2010.  
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economic power and a force to be reckoned with in any discussion of global economic 
and financial issues.  With six members, Asia is well represented in the G20 grouping.  
The grouping could provide the platform for Asia to push for major reforms of the 
IMF and other major international organizations, to make sure that their policies are 
aligned with Asia’s interests. 
 
The expansion of the Financial Stability Forum and its re-establishment as the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2009, too, has given Asia a bigger say in providing 
oversight over the global financial system. Meanwhile, there are efforts to expand the 
BIS and other international standard setting bodies to include more countries from 
Asia and other regions.  Asia is expected to play a more active role in the BIS and 
other international standard setting bodies such as Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, IOSCO, CPSS and IAIS, to ensure that these bodies take into account the 
economic circumstances of the Asian countries in setting the international standards 
for the various regulatory frameworks.  In recognition of the growing weight of the 
developing countries in the global economy (including Asia), reforms have also been 
initiated at the IMF to increase the quotas of the developing countries although this 
has met with resistance from some of the European countries which are at risk of 
losing their shares.   
 
(IV) Conclusion 
 
The recent financial crisis which paralyzed the financial markets in the US and 
Europe has highlighted the need to fundamentally reform and strengthen the global 
financial system to make it more robust and resilient to shocks.  The US and Europe 
were hit hard by the crisis, both of which experienced a severe economic downturn 
and a near-collapse in their financial systems.  Many Asian countries felt the impact 
of the crisis mainly through the trade channel while their financial systems remained 
relatively unscathed.  This difference in experience explains the muted response from 
Asia to the various proposals for financial reforms that have been put forward so far.  
These proposals are seen largely as attempts to address the weaknesses and flaws of 
the financial systems in the US and Europe.    
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However, Asia has important stakes in the global economy and should not be a 
bystander in the broader reform of the global financial system. While the most 
immediate cause of the recent crisis may be attributed to the weaknesses in the 
financial systems in the US and Europe, its deeper causes can be traced to systemic 
risks in the global economy related to issues such as the large and persistent 
macroeconomic imbalances in the global economy, the size and volatility of capital 
flows, the flexibility of exchange rates, the inadequacy of the regulatory regimes and 
the architecture and governance of the international financial system.  Being among 
some of the most open economies in the world (even if their financial markets are not 
as liberalized as those in Europe and the US), it will not be possible for Asian 
countries to insulate themselves from global events. Asia’s ability in escaping the 
worst excess of the recent crisis does not mean that it will be as lucky the next time.  
Post crisis, Asian economies should capitalize on their strengthened position to play a 
bigger role in international financial reforms, to ensure that the reforms are in line 
with developments in their own economies and are thus sufficiently broad to be 
effective in preventing future crises. 
 
Recent experiences in reforming the governance structure and regulatory regimes of 
the international financial system reinforce the view that Asian countries should play 
a more pro-active role in such reforms.  While many of these reforms are headed in 
the right direction, some of them do not go far enough in addressing the concerns of 
the Asian countries.  For instance, there have been strong resistance against the 
proposals for a major reform of the governance structure of the IMF to raise the 
voting shares of dynamic developing countries, particularly those in Asia, by a 
significant amount because such reforms would reduce the shares of certain European 
countries by an equivalent amount.  Consequently, Asia should remain engaged in the 
current financial reforms of the international financial system to ensure that its 
interests are taken into account in the reforms.    
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